Torture and the Necessity Doctrine by Cohan, John Alan
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 41 
Number 4 Symposium on Electronic Privacy in 
the Information Age 
pp.1587-1632 
Symposium on Electronic Privacy in the Information Age 
Torture and the Necessity Doctrine 
John Alan Cohan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John Alan Cohan, Torture and the Necessity Doctrine, 41 Val. U. L. Rev. 1587 (2007). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University 
Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
 1587
Articles 
TORTURE AND THE NECESSITY DOCTRINE 
John Alan Cohan∗ 
Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with 
the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace 
and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to 
torture to death only one tiny creature—that baby beating its 
breast with its fist, for instance—and to found that edifice on 
its unavenged tears, would you consent to be the architect on 
those conditions?  Tell me, and tell the truth.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The use of torture undertaken to obtain information to prevent an 
imminent terrorist attack has been the focus of much scholarly work.  
Much of the extensive commentary on this subject has alluded to the 
necessity doctrine as justification for torturing a suspect who likely has 
information concerning a “ticking bomb,” but there has been little 
elaboration on just how the necessity doctrine would work in this 
context.2  
                                                 
∗  J.D., Loyola Law School, magna cum laude, 1972; B.A., University of Southern 
California, 1969.  Mr. Cohan was a law clerk to the Hon. Charles H. Carr, United States 
District Court Judge for the Central District of California, and an adjunct professor at 
Western State University School of Law.  He has written numerous articles in law review 
publications and philosophy journals.  Mr. Cohan’s current research encompasses the areas 
of international law, philosophy of society, environmental law, criminal law, and 
jurisprudence. 
1 FYDOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 291 (Constance Garnett, trans., 
Vintage Books 1955). 
2 See, e.g., Julie Angell, Ethics, Torture, and Marginal Memoranda at the DOJ Office of Legal 
Counsel, l8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 557 (2005); Mirko Bagaric & Julie Clarke, Not Enough 
Official Torture in the World? The Circumstances in Which Torture Is Morally Justifiable, 39 
U.S.F. L. REV. 581, 588-89 (2005); Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: 
Lawyers and Torture, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 689 (2004); John Cornyn, In Defense of Alberto R. 
Gonzales and the l949 Geneva Conventions, 9 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 213 (2005); Alan M. 
Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor Strauss, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 275 
(2003-04) [hereinafter Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant]; Oswaldo A. Estrada, Human 
Dignity and the Convention Against Torture: Has the Burden of Proof Become Heavier than 
Originally Intended?, 3 REGENT J. INT’L L. 87 (2005); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Torture, 
Necessity, and the Union of Law & Philosophy, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 183 (2004); Oren Gross, Are 
Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REV. 
1481 (2004); Linda M. Keller, Is Truth Serum Torture?, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 521 (2005); 
Harold Hojgju Koh, A World Without Torture, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 641 (2005); 
Sanford Levinson, Ticking Bombs and Catastrophes, 8 GREEN BAG 3ll (2005); David Luban, 
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This Article starts from the empirical observation that no other 
practice except slavery is so universally condemned in law and human 
convention as torture.  While ethicists all agree that torture is morally 
repugnant, there are competing theories—utilitarianism and 
deontology—on just how that should play out in the world.3  
The deontological claim is that torture is categorically wrong under 
any circumstances because of its intrinsic affront to human decency and 
dignity.  If there is anything meaningful in the concept “human rights,” 
then the right of the individual not to be subjected to torture is so 
fundamental that it cannot be derogated even in extreme circumstances.  
There has, at least until recently, been the tendency to assume that the 
deontological prohibition of torture presents few conceptual or ethical 
problems.  The opposing view, which is examined in this Article, is that 
there are utilitarian “exceptions” that would allow torture in certain 
circumstances, even while acknowledging that the practice is morally 
repugnant.  
First, this Article examines the deontological and utilitarian ideas 
behind the use of torture.  Its goal is to provide a solution to the dilemma 
between deontology and utilitarianism through the common law 
doctrine of necessity.  In particular, this Article considers the 
underpinnings of the prohibition against torture in international law and 
how this has developed in recent years.  After a brief overview of the 
definition of torture, referring to various international documents, the 
Article will briefly explore the controversial Justice Department 
memoranda of 2002 and 2004 that suggested a certain leeway in the 
definition of torture.  Then, this Article turns to an analysis of the 
                                                                                                             
Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425 (2005); Andrew A. Moher, The 
Lesser of Two Evils? An Argument for Judicially Sanctioned Torture in a Post-9/11 World, 26 T. 
JEFFERSON L. REV. 469 (2004); Jason R. Odeshoo, Truth or Dare?: Terrorism and “Truth Serum” 
in the Post-9/11 World, 57 STAN. L. REV. 209 (2004); Adam Raviv, Torture and Justification: 
Defending the Indefensible, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135, 151-53 (2004); Louis-Philippe F. 
Rouillard, Misinterpreting the Prohibition of Torture Under International Law: The Office of Legal 
Counsel Memorandum, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 9 (2005); Louis Michael Seidman, Torture’s 
Truth, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 881 (2005); Elizabeth S. Silker, Terrorists, Interrogation, and Torture: 
Where Do We Draw the Line?, 31 J. LEGIS.  191 (2004). 
3 The most important proponent of deontological moral theory in Western thought is 
undoubtedly Immanuel Kant.  See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF 
MORALS (Cambridge Univ. Press 1991).  For a contemporary account, see, e.g., ROBERT 
NOZICK, ANARCHY STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).  Important proponents of utilitarianism (or, 
more generally, consequentialism) include Jeremy Bentham, (see JEREMY BENTHAM, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart 
eds., Univ. of London 1970)) and John Stuart Mill (see J. S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Roger 
Crisp ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1999)). 
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“ticking bomb” case developed by Alan Dershowitz, and discusses his 
salient justifications.  As fantastic as the situation might seem, it raises 
fundamental issues for consideration and helps us evaluate the moral 
principles associated with torture and the necessity doctrine.   
Next, the Article explains the underpinnings of the necessity 
doctrine, its various elements, and the application of those elements to 
the ticking bomb case.  The Article touches upon the deployment of 
torture by the French against Algerians and the Israelis against 
Palestinian detainees.  Finally, this Article concludes that while the moral 
objections to torture are potent, these arguments are not persuasive 
when the stakes are high enough. 
II.  DEONTOLOGICAL AND UTILITARIAN IDEAS CONCERNING THE USE OF 
TORTURE 
Deontological ethical theories hold that certain moral rules that 
govern the most important aspects of how we ought to live our lives 
have no exceptions.  Deontology claims that it is impermissible to violate 
these rules even though better consequences would result.  Many of 
these moral constraints are also laws that, for the most part, admit of no 
exceptions. 
There is always a dilemma with deontological constraints because, 
on the one hand, there may be a greater good produced in violating the 
constraint and, on the other hand, the constraint is a way to protect the 
dignity and liberty of the individual whose rights are at issue.  The 
tension is between a categorical imperative and social utility, between 
rights and interests, and between absolutism and consequentialism.  
On the utilitarian side, a number of commentators believe that in a 
post-September 11 world, the use of torture is permissible, or indeed 
justifiable, in extreme situations to obtain information for investigative 
purposes.4  The use of torture, under this view, would be justifiable in 
                                                 
4 See Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 227 (2003-04).  No less a civil 
libertarian than Justice Thurgood Marshall said in a dissent: 
[T]he public’s safety can be perfectly well protected without abridging 
the Fifth Amendment.  If a bomb is about to explode or the public is 
otherwise imminently imperiled, the police are free to interrogate 
suspects without advising them of their constitutional rights. . . . If 
trickery is necessary to protect the public, then the police may trick a 
suspect into confessing. . . . All the Fifth Amendment forbids is the 
introduction of coerced statements at trial. 
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 686 (1984). 
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the war against terrorism as a last resort “when there is no alternative 
and when hundreds, thousands, potentially hundreds of thousands of 
lives hang in the balance . . . .”5  The argument is that “methods of 
interrogation that normally would not be tolerated in a free society 
nonetheless might be constitutionally permissible if there is a compelling 
government interest that out-weighs an individual’s rights.”6  Under this 
utilitarian view, torture is morally permissible if the benefits to third 
parties significantly outweigh the harm to the victim.   
It just isn’t true that one should allow a nuclear war 
rather than killing or torturing an innocent person.  It 
isn’t even true that one should allow the destruction of a 
sizable city by a terrorist nuclear device rather than kill 
or torture an innocent person.  To prevent such 
extraordinary harms extreme actions seem to me to be 
justified.7  
No less a libertarian than Jeremy Bentham argued that there are 
cases in which nobody would object to the deployment of torture.8  
Bentham’s justification for the use of torture was based on case or act 
utilitarianism—a demonstration that, in a particular case, the benefits 
that would flow from the limited use of torture would outweigh its costs.  
He emphasized: 
Suppose an occasion, to arise, in which a suspicion is 
entertained, as strong as that which would be received 
as a sufficient ground for arrest and commitment as for 
felony—a suspicion that at this very time a considerable 
number of individuals are actually suffering, by illegal 
violence inflictions equal in intensity to those which if 
inflicted by the hand of justice, would universally be 
spoken of under the name of torture.  For the purpose of 
rescuing from torture these hundred innocents, should 
any scruple be made of applying equal or superior 
torture, to extract the requisite information from the 
mouth of one criminal, who having it in his power to 
make known the place where at this time the enormity 
was practising or about to be practised, should refuse to 
                                                 
5 Strauss, supra note 4, at 254. 
6 Id. at 239. 
7 Michael S. Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISR. L. REV. 280, 328 (1989). 
8 See W.L. Twining & P.E. Twining, Bentham on Torture, 24 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 305, 310 
(1973). 
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do so?  To say nothing of wisdom, could any pretence be 
made so much as to the praise of blind and vulgar 
humanity, by the man who to save one criminal, should 
determine to abandon a 100 innocent persons to the 
same fate?9  
In effect, this Article argues that there cannot be an absolutist 
position taken with respect to any rights, not even fundamental rights.  
Under this view, the universal norm against torture is not absolute, just 
as the right of free speech and the right to be free from being 
intentionally killed by another are not absolute.  If the prohibition 
against intentional homicide, for instance, were absolute, then self-
defense or killing to prevent someone from killing a third party, or to 
prevent a suspected felon from escaping, would be impermissible.  In 
fact, the law regards these acts as not only permissible, but justifiable.   
An absolutist position may come into conflict with our common 
sense moral intuitions.  A typical example would be a situation where 
the killing of one innocent person would save the lives of many others, a 
topic well addressed in the literature.10  While torture is a grievous and 
                                                 
9 See id. at 347 n.3 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Bentham Mss. Box 74.b., p. 429 
(May 27, 1804)). 
10 For instance, we might refer to a hypothetical dilemma posed by Bernard Williams, A 
Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 75, 98 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1973): 
 The captain of the local police in a small South American town is about to kill twenty 
innocent Indians when Jim stumbles onto the scene.  The captain gives Jim a choice.  As a 
courtesy to Jim, the captain says that if Jim kills one of the hostages, the captain will let the 
other nineteen go free; if Jim refuses to accept the offer, all twenty will be executed. 
 Should Jim accept the offer?  Is necessity a justification that makes it morally 
permissible to proceed with the killing?  Or, on deontological grounds, must Jim refuse?  
Williams sees this as a difficult case but in the end seems inclined to say that Jim should kill 
the one Indian.  There is no realistic way of saving all twenty. 
 If Jim should refuse the “invitation” to kill the one innocent person, and instead walks 
away from the situation, we would hesitate to condemn him even his refusal results in the 
death of the entire group.  Jim may regret the mass killing he failed to prevent, but yet he 
will remain free of moral fault for having failed to act.  By not acting, he simply allows 
something to happen, which is the same result as if he had never come upon the scene in 
the first place. 
 The argument in support of Jim’s shooting the one victim is that it is hard to see how 
killing can be condemned as immoral when it leaves the victim no worse off—he would 
have been shot anyway.  Jim has no realistic way of saving all twenty of the Indians.  
Killing the one Indian would not make that person any worse off than he was otherwise 
going to be.  The one suffers the same loss he would have suffered had Jim not been in the 
picture.  And on top of that the action benefits others substantially. 
 As the consequences become more catastrophic, if for instance, Jim’s action of killing 
the one Indian would result in saving 1,000 others, deontological prohibitions would seem 
Cohan: Torture and the Necessity Doctrine
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abominable practice that is universally condemned, if our moral 
intuitions allow for exceptions in cases of intentional killing, it would 
seem to provide exceptions in cases of nonlethal torture.  But we need 
not rely on intuitions.  For our purposes, we may well rely on the 
necessity doctrine and its application to cases of torture.  Under this 
doctrine, the letter of the law might be violated justifiably because of the 
necessity of the circumstances, as explored in Part V.   
III.  GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT TORTURE 
A. International Law 
Several international agreements prohibit the use of torture in any 
circumstances, including the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,11 Article 5 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,12 Article 7 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCRP”),13 and the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (“the U.N. Convention”).14  These conventions 
generally impose an absolute prohibition on the use of torture or other 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.   
In 1994, the United States ratified the U.N. Convention,15 which 
allows that “Certain rights may be restricted in emergency situations,” 
and that such emergencies “must be proved to require a particular 
restriction on a right” before derogation will be permitted.16  However, it 
is clear that “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state 
                                                                                                             
to be increasingly problematic to guide one’s decision-making process.  If one agrees that it 
is morally permissible, or even morally required, that Jim commit the act, then, unless 
torturing is worse than killing, one would allow the moral view that torture of a suspect is 
permissible, if not morally required, when it will likely save the lives of many innocents. 
11 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
12 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 
71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).  “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”  Id. 
13 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
175 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].  “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.”  Id. 
14 United Nations Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. 
Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]. 
15 See Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478, 8478 
(Feb. 19, 1999). 
16 John Quigley, International Limits on Use of Force to Elicit Confessions: A Critique of 
Israel’s Policy on Interrogation, 14 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 485, 491-92 (1988). 
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of war or a threat of war, internal political in stability or any other public 
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.”17  Thus, the 
prohibition is absolute, admitting of no exceptions.  The deontological 
view that torture is prohibited under any circumstances has found its 
way into customary international law, along with crimes against 
humanity, genocide, rape, hijacking, and terrorism.18  Similarly, the 
ICCPR expressly states in Article 2(2) that “No exceptional circumstances 
whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political in 
stability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification 
of torture.”19  The absolutist approach means that if a terrorist in the 
ticking bomb situation, which is discussed in Part IV, refuses to tell the 
bomb’s location, then the consequences of the holocaust will simply have 
to be endured.  From a human rights approach, what matters is how we 
live our lives; the act of torturing someone, for whatever reason, so 
distorts human beings that it can never be allowed. 
B. The De Facto Violation of Torture Conventions   
In a study of whether countries that have signed human rights 
treaties have refrained from using torture more than countries that have 
not, Oona Hathaway found the difference to be almost statistically 
insignificant, with an average gap of just 0.06 on a 1-to-5 scale.20  In fact, 
according to Hathaway’s study, signators of the American Torture 
Convention21 and the African Charter22 have worse records on torture 
than the regional organizations that did not sign these treaties.23  States 
that engage in torture to exact confessions or use it as a mode of 
punishment always deny that they use torture.24  
                                                 
17 Convention Against Torture, supra note 14, at art. 2(2) (adopted by the U.N. General 
Assembly, Dec. 12, 1984, and in effect since June 26, 1987, after it was ratified by twenty 
nations). 
18 See GEERT-JAN G. J. KNOOPS, DEFENSES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 29 (2001). 
19 ICCPR, supra note 13, at art 2(2). 
20 See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 
1935, 1978 (2002). 
21 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, 25 I.L.M. 519 
(entered into force Feb. 28, 1987). 
22 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered 
into force Oct. 21, 1986). 
23 See Hathaway, supra note 20, at 1979. 
24 See AMNESTY INT’L, REPORT ON TORTURE 104 (1975).  “Though many authoritarian 
regimes use torture, not one of even these openly admits it.”  Is Torture Ever Justified?, THE 
ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2003, at 9. 
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It has been widely reported that the United States has transferred 
terrorist suspects who refused to cooperate with their interrogators to 
foreign intelligence services.25  Similarly, it is widely reported that 
torture is used in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, the Philippines, Iran, and 
Pakistan, among numerous other countries.26  A study of 195 countries 
and territories by Amnesty International between 1997 and mid-2000 
found reports of torture or ill-treatment by state officials in more than 
150 countries,27 and in more than seventy countries, torture or ill-
treatment was reported as widespread or persistent.28  
C. Definition of Torture   
What exactly constitutes torture?  Is there any agreement on the 
definition of torture?  Certainly, the boundaries of the concept of torture 
are undefined.  If we allow a largely sentimental definition of torture in 
which it means whatever anyone wishes it to mean, or if virtually any 
discomfort, physical, or emotional pain inflicted constitutes torture, the 
concept loses its ability to shock and disgust.  Moreover, universal 
condemnation may be eroded if the definition is too broad. 
Reasonable individuals might disagree as to whether keeping 
individuals “standing or kneeling for hours, in black hoods or spray-
painted goggles” constitutes torture, or whether holding them “in 
awkward, painful positions and deprived of sleep with a 24-hour 
bombardment of lights—subject to what are known as ‘stress and duress’ 
techniques[,]” constitute torture.29  In fact, certain techniques that involve 
physical discomfort or pain, such as protracted standing against the wall 
on tip toes, exposing a suspect to loud noise, putting hoods on suspects 
during detention, while constituting inhumane and degrading treatment, 
have also been held not to constitute torture.30  Other practices that may 
constitute torture to some minds include solitary confinement for an 
                                                 
25 Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations: ‘Stress and 
Duress’ Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 
26, 2002, at A1.  “Some who do not cooperate are turned over—’rendered,’ in official 
parlance—to foreign intelligence services whose practice of torture has been documented 
by the U.S. government and human rights organizations.”  Id. 
26 See Raviv, supra note 2, at 151-53. 
27 AMNESTY INT’L, TORTURE WORLDWIDE: AN AFFRONT TO HUMAN DIGNITY 2 (2000). 
28 See id. 
29 Priest & Gellman, supra note 25, at A1. 
30 See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1978) (holding that protracted 
standing against the wall on tip toes, covering the suspect’s head during detention, 
exposing the suspect to loud noise for a prolonged period of time, and sleep, food, and 
drink deprivation did not constitute torture, but were prohibited because they subjected 
the suspect to inhuman and degrading treatment). 
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extended period of time, dousing in ice cold water, playing of loud 
music, or mental suffering inflicted on a person (such as threats of 
execution or mock execution rituals).31  In some instances, torture might 
not involve physical discomfort at all:  for instance, reasonable people 
might agree that to force a Muslim individual to fall to his knees and kiss 
the cross can be humiliation and torture. 
Yet others may think that the treatment of prisoners in the Abu 
Ghraib prison, in which a number of Iraqi prisoners were subjected to 
sexual humiliation, constituted torture.32  According to various accounts, 
numerous prisoners at the detention center were hooded, stripped 
naked, and mocked sexually by female guards.  Other reports indicated 
that detainees in Afghanistan’s Bagram Detention Center were subjected 
to abuse in the form of sleep deprivation, punching and kicking, and 
standing in difficult positions for prolonged periods of time.33  Two 
prisoners died, and the death was listed by a military pathologist as 
homicide.34  These acts, while certainly cruel, inhuman, and degrading, 
might not amount to torture under the conventions discussed below.  It 
is debatable. 
Torture is defined in the U.N. Convention as follows: 
For the purposes of this Convention, the term “torture” 
means any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on 
a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him 
for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based 
on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or 
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with 
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity.  It does not include 
                                                 
31 For a good discussion of what constitutes torture, see Emanuel Gross, Legal Aspects of 
Tackling Terrorism: The Balance Between the Right of a Democracy To Defend Itself and the 
Protection of Human Rights, 6 U.C.L.A. J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 89, 94-97 (2001). 
32 See, e.g., Susan Sontag, Regarding the Torture of Others, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 23, 2004, 
at 24. 
33 See Douglas Jehl & David Rohde, The Struggle for Iraq: Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2004, 
at A1, A12. 
34 See id. 
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pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions.35  
In connection with ratification of the U.N. Convention by the United 
States Senate, the following statement of understanding was set forth: 
(2) Torture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman 
treatment and does not include lesser forms of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment that do 
not amount to torture. . . .  
(4) In order to constitute torture, mental pain or 
suffering must be prolonged mental harm caused by or 
resulting from: 
(i) The intentional infliction or threatened 
infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; 
(ii) The administration or application, or 
threatened administration or application, of 
mind altering substances or other procedures 
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or 
the personality; 
(iii) The threat of imminent death; or 
(iv) The threat that another person will 
imminently be subjected to death, severe 
physical pain or suffering, or the administration 
or application of mind altering substances or 
other procedures calculated to disrupt 
profoundly the sense or personality.36 
Thus, in addition to physical torture there can be psychological 
torture, such as threatening to execute the suspect, putting a gun to his 
head and saying you will shoot, threatening to castrate him, telling him 
that you are going to kill his family members if he does not tell you the 
information you are seeking, and similar tactics that, while not 
physically painful, inflict mental pain or suffering, even when there is no 
intent to carry out such threats.  The United States’s interpretation of the 
U.N. Convention is that such infliction of mental pain or suffering must 
be prolonged in order to constitute torture.  This “prolonged” 
qualification is at odds with the definition provided by the U.N. 
Convention itself. 
                                                 
35 Convention Against Torture, supra note 14, at art. 1(1). 
36 See Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478, 8490 
(Feb. 19, 1999). 
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In 1997, the United Nations Committee Against Torture concluded 
that certain physical coercive methods employed by Israel during 
interrogations of detainees, especially when used in combination, 
constituted torture as defined by the U.N. Convention.  The tactics 
included forcing detainees to stand naked with their hands chained to 
the ceiling and their feet shackled, covering their heads with black 
hoods, forcing them to stand or kneel in uncomfortable positions in 
extreme cold or heat, sleep deprivation, food deprivation, exposing them 
to disorienting sounds and lights, and violent shaking.37  
Thus, the nature and definition of torture, as discussed here, 
involves more than coercive techniques, such as sleep deprivation or 
bright lights.  To be sure, breaking bones, burning skin, and ripping out 
fingernails constitute “real, unambiguous torture” as opposed to threats 
to cause pain, or deprivation of sleep or food.38  “[T]here is a world of 
difference morally between the slight tortures of sleep deprivation and 
the severe tortures of physical mutilation.”39 
D. The United States Department of Justice Memoranda   
An August 1, 2002 legal opinion prepared by the Department of 
Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel40 received significant criticism and little 
approbation for essentially authorizing and justifying torture.41  This 
memorandum sought to interpret torture as defined under 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2340-2340A, which pertain to both physical torture and “severe mental 
pain or suffering.”  The memorandum stated that “[P]hysical pain 
amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain 
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment 
                                                 
37 See Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant, supra note 2, at 286 n.57 (citing Press Release, UN 
Committee Against Torture, UN Committee Against Torture Concludes Eighteenth Session 
Geneva (May 13, 1997)). 
38 Stuart Taylor, Should We Hit Him?, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 10, 2003, at 52. 
39 Moore, supra note 7, at 334. 
40 Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Office of the 
Assistant Attorney General to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of 
Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A, at 46, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo200 
20801.pdf [hereinafter Standards of Conduct Memorandum I]. 
41 See, e.g., Angell, supra note 2, at 557; Bilder & Vagts, supra note 2, at 689; Cornyn, supra 
note 2, at 213; Marisa Lopez, Professional Reponsibility: Tortured Independence in the Office of 
Legal Counsel, 57 FLA. L. REV. 685 (2005); Jesselyn Radack, Tortured Legal Ethics: The Role of 
the Government Advisor in the War on Terrorism, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. l (2006); Rouillard, supra 
note 2, at 9; Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, l05 
COLUM. L. REV. l68l (2005). 
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of bodily function, or even death.”42  This interpretation was disavowed 
in a later memorandum issued in 2004, discussed below.  
 Under the 2002 memorandum, for mental pain and suffering to 
amount to torture, “it must result in significant psychological harm of 
significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years.”43  The 
memorandum sought to interpret the statutory text of 18 U.S.C. § 2340, 
which states that “severe mental pain or suffering” means “prolonged 
mental harm”44 that is caused by or results from the exact same 
components stated in paragraph (4)(i)-(iv) of the Senate’s statement of 
understanding that accompanied the ratification of the U.N. Convention, 
quoted above. 
The memorandum also argued that a defendant is guilty of torture 
under the statute “only if he acts with the express purpose of inflicting 
severe pain or suffering . . . .”45  Accordingly, if “a government defendant 
were to harm an enemy combatant during an interrogation in a manner 
that might arguably violate Section 2340A, he would be doing so in order 
to prevent further attacks on the United States by the Al Qaeda terrorist 
network.”46  And, if the defendant’s purpose is to obtain information, 
even though he knows that “severe pain will result from his actions, . . . 
he lacks the requisite specific intent” to violate the statute.47  The 
memorandum also stated that interrogators could justify torture under 
the doctrine of necessity and self-defense in connection with the “war on 
terrorism.”48 
The memorandum relied in part on the English High Court opinion 
in Ireland v. United Kingdom,49 which held that inhuman or degrading 
treatment is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to constitute 
torture.  The techniques at issue in that case were (1) wall standing 
(forcing detainees to remain for periods of some hours in a “stress 
position”); (2) hooding (putting a dark bag over the detainees’ heads and 
only removing it during interrogation); (3) subjection to continuous loud 
                                                 
42 See Standards of Conduct Memorandum I, supra note 40. 
43 See id. (emphasis added). 
44 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2000) (emphasis added). 
45 See Standards of Conduct Memorandum I, supra note 40. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. 
48 See id. 
49 Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1978). 
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and hissing noises; (4) sleep deprivation; and (5) deprivation of food and 
drink.50  
The 2002 memorandum by the U.S. Department of Justice was 
superseded by another one published in 2004.51  The 2004 memorandum 
diminishes the extreme statements in the earlier memorandum.  It 
reiterates that torture is a graver kind of act than mere ill treatment and 
emphasizes that torture is an aggravated form of ill treatment.  However, 
it disagrees with the earlier view that an extremely high degree of 
physical pain is necessary for torture to occur.52  
IV.  TORTURE AND THE TICKING BOMB SITUATION 
A. The Nature of the Problem   
As mentioned, under the deontological approach, torturing someone 
in order to reveal the location of a ticking bomb that will detonate and 
kill thousands of people is morally prohibited regardless of the beneficial 
consequences.  In his book, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the 
Threat, Responding to the Challenge, Alan Dershowitz argues that there is 
little doubt that the use of nonlethal torture as well as other techniques of 
coercion short of torture (such as very rough interrogation) can produce 
leads that can help prevent the killing of many civilians.53   
                                                 
50 See id. 
51 Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Office of the 
Assistant Attorney General, for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, Legal 
Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/dojtorture123004mem.pdf [hereinafter 
Standards of Conduct Memorandum II]. 
52 See id. 
53 See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, 
RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 140 (Yale Univ. Press 2002) [hereinafter DERSHOWITZ, WHY 
TERRORISM WORKS].  Apart from interrogational torture, another type of torture is done not 
to extract information but to intimidate others or to deter dissent with the expected impact 
of the news of the torture on other people over whom the torture victim has some power or 
leadership.  This is what we might call terroristic torture, the effect of which is to terrorize 
people other than the victim of the torture.  The victim’s suffering is being used as a means 
to an end over which the victim has little control, namely to deter dissent.  China and other 
authoritarian states are known to use this technique. 
 Terroristic torture might be justified under the necessity doctrine in order to protect 
national security by averting the evil of dissidents who may be urging the overthrow of 
government or fomenting anarchy. One commentator proffered a list of necessary 
conditions, all of which would have to be satisfied in order for terroristic torture to be 
morally permissible:  
A first necessary condition would be that the purpose actually being 
sought through the torture would need to be not only morally good 
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The ticking bomb is a situation when a terrorist who admits to 
planting a weapon of mass destruction in a largely populated city but 
refuses to say where—a situation that has been discussed by 
philosophers, including Michael Walzer, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Jeremy 
Bentham.54  Of course, we can imagine other situations that do not 
involve bombs but are equally perilous, such as a planned release of a 
deadly chemical or biological agency.  Waltzer described such a 
hypothetical case in which a decent leader of a nation plagued with 
terrorism is asked  
                                                                                                             
but supremely important, and examples of such purposes would have 
to be selected by criteria of moral importance which would themselves 
need to be justified.  Second, terroristic torture would presumably 
have to be the least harmful means of accomplishing the supremely 
important goal.  Given how very harmful terroristic torture is, this 
could rarely be the case.  And it would be unlikely unless the period of 
use of the torture in the society was limited in an enforceable manner.  
Third, it would have to be absolutely clear for what purpose the 
terroristic torture was being used, what would constitute achievement 
of that purpose, and thus, when the torture would end.  The torture 
could not become a standard practice of government for an indefinite 
duration. 
Henry Shue, Torture, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124, 137-38 (1978).  Shue notes with skepticism that 
is it hard to conceive any “supremely important end” to which terroristic torture would be 
the least harmful means of attaining.  Id.  Such use of torture could have the effect of 
creating outrage in the population and exacerbated unrest over a tyrannical regime.  On the 
other hand if terroristic torture is effective in quieting dissent from the perspective of the 
government, since it “worked,” it would continue to be used. 
54 Another scenario is this:  Suppose a terrorist has planted a megaton atomic bomb that 
will obliterate several square miles and kill hundreds of thousands of people.  Either 
torture the terrorist who will provide the specific location about the bomb in time to find it 
and neutralize it; or drop several large bombs on the vicinity where the bomb is known to 
be located, killing hundreds of innocent adult and children civilians in the vicinity, but 
preventing the bomb from detonating and killing thousands of others. 
 This “solution” is not farfetched.  On the morning of September 11, 2001, after the 
World Trade Center was hit, and it appeared clear that a terrorist hijacking was in progress 
with United Flight 93, some eighty miles inbound from Washington, D.C., the Vice 
President, based on his prior conversation with the President, authorized Air Force fighter 
aircraft to shoot down the hijacked aircraft.  See Excerpts from Report on Orders To Shoot 
Down Planes on Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2004, at A17.  Officials believed that the plane 
was headed towards the U.S. Capitol or the White House.  Id.  Innocent people who 
themselves were non-threats were so situated that they were subject to an order to be killed 
in order to avert a greater danger.  Id. 
 Subsequently, the German Parliament passed a law authorizing the military to shoot 
down civilian airplanes if it believes they are being used in a 9/11-style terrorist attack.  See 
Kristen Grieshaber, World Briefing Germany: New Air Security Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2004, 
at A4.  In addition, Poland enacted a similar law that allows the head of the Polish Air 
Force to order hijacked aircraft shot down as a last resort.  See Victor Homola, World 
Briefing Poland: Law Allows Hijacked Planes to be Shot Down, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, at A9. 
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to authorize the torture of a captured rebel leader who 
knows or probably knows the location of a number of 
bombs hidden in apartment buildings around the city, 
set to go off within the next twenty-four hours.  He 
orders the man tortured, convinced that he must do so 
for the sake of the people who might otherwise die in 
the explosions—even though he believes that torture is 
wrong, indeed abominable, not just sometimes, but 
always.55 
Dershowitz acknowledges that the use of torture is a violation of 
core civil liberties and human rights, but he argues that a cost-benefit 
analysis illustrates the justification for employing nonlethal torture.56  
Moreover, Dershowitz clearly understands certain deontological 
objections.  He says: 
The case against torture, if made by a Quaker who 
opposes the death penalty, war, self-defense, and the use 
of lethal force against fleeing felons, is understandable.  
But for anyone who justifies killing on the basis of a cost-
benefit analysis, the case against the use of nonlethal 
torture to save multiple lives is more difficult to make.57  
On a related point, Dershowitz emphasizes that the law permits judges 
to imprison witnesses who refuse to testify after being given a grant of 
immunity.58  A recalcitrant witness may be imprisoned until he talks, 
and prison is designed to be punitive—that is, painful.  “Such 
imprisonment can, on occasion, produce more pain and greater risk of 
death than nonlethal torture.  Yet we continue to threaten and use the 
pain of imprisonment to loosen the tongues of reluctant witnesses.”59  
                                                 
55 Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 160, 167 
(1973). 
56 DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 53, at 144. 
The simple cost-benefit analysis for employing such nonlethal torture 
seems overwhelming: it is surely better to inflict nonlethal pain on one 
guilty terrorist who is illegally withholding information needed to 
prevent an act of terrorism than to permit a large number of innocent 
victims to die.  Pain is a lesser and more remediable harm than death; 
and the lives of a thousand innocent people should be valued more 
than the bodily integrity of one guilty person. 
Id. 
57 Id. at 148. 
58 For example, it is illegal to withhold relevant information from a grand jury after 
receiving immunity.  See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
59 DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 53, at 147. 
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Therefore, the imposition of nonlethal torture, in circumstances where a 
great many lives are in jeopardy, would seem unobjectionable.  
Further, Dershowitz points to the anomaly in the law that permits 
police to use lethal force against fleeing suspects of dangerous felonies, 
even though they are only suspects not yet brought to trial.  “The very 
idea of deliberately subjecting a captive human being to excruciating 
pain violates our sense of what is acceptable.”60  It seems far worse to 
shoot and kill a fleeing felon in the back than to torture an informant in 
the ticking bomb situation; yet every civilized government authorizes 
shooting a suspected felon who flees from the police.  With nonlethal 
torture, the pain is temporary, while death is permanent.  “In our 
modern age death is underrated, while pain is overrated.”61  
B. Torture Warrants   
Dershowitz suggests that “torture warrants” might be 
implemented—a procedure which would require an application on the 
part of investigators and, if due cause is shown, a magistrate to authorize 
the procedure.  Torture warrants were in frequent use in England during 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  In his book on legalized torture, 
Torture and the Law of Proof, John Langbein points out that torture was 
used to obtain evidence necessary to prove the guilt of the accused under 
the rigorous standards of evidence of the time, which required either the 
testimony of two eyewitnesses or the confession of the accused; 
circumstantial evidence was simply inadmissible in those days.  Thus, if 
officials had a “suspicion” based on compelling circumstantial evidence 
of guilt, they would want to pursue their hunches and seek to exact a 
“direct” confession from the suspect by obtaining a torture warrant.62  
Torture was also used for people who were convicted of capital 
crimes, such as high treason, in an effort to obtain further information 
necessary to prevent future attacks on the state.  Langbein shows that of 
eighty-one torture warrants, issued between 1540 and 1640, many of 
them were used for discovery in order to protect the government from 
plots.63  Of course, torture was undoubtedly abused, as is famously 
known during the reign of Henry VIII. 
                                                 
60 Id. at 155. 
61 Id. at 149. 
62 JOHN LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF 7 (2006). 
63 See id. at 90. 
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This Article mentions Dershowitz’s proposal of torture warrants 
only in passing.  Of course, one might well argue against this procedure 
in that officials might abuse their discretion in applying for torture 
warrants; both the granting or the denial of torture warrants would have 
severe repercussions, and in emergencies there may simply be 
insufficient time to apply for a torture warrant. 
C. Is the Fifth Amendment a Bar to Torture?   
The Fifth Amendment prohibits compelled self-incrimination, which 
means that statements elicited by means of torture or other coercive 
techniques may not be introduced into evidence against the individual 
being tortured.64  Coerced confessions are inadmissible in court, whether 
the confession is obtained by physical brutality or induced by such 
tactics as lengthy incommunicado detentions,65 sleep deprivation,66 
involuntary nakedness,67 “truth serum,”68 or protracted questioning over 
a period of days.69  
However, the use of torture solely to gain information is a separate 
matter.  In Leon v. Wainwright,70 apparently for the first time in American 
jurisprudence, the Florida Court of Appeals “articulated a distinction 
between violent police conduct, the purpose of which is to gain 
information which might save a life, and such conduct employed for the 
purpose of obtaining evidence to be used in a court of law.”71  In Leon, 
the defendant was convicted of kidnapping and possession of a firearm 
during commission of a felony.72  On a writ of habeas corpus, the Court 
of Appeals considered the question of whether Leon’s post-arrest 
confession should have been suppressed as the product of earlier police 
threats and physical violence.73  Violence had certainly occurred in these 
circumstances.  The defendant kidnapped a cabdriver and held him for 
                                                 
64 See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (holding that confessions obtained 
by torture as a basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process).  But see 
Leon v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 770 (llth Cir. l984) (holding that a subsequent statement made 
by a suspect who had been previously tortured into revealing the location of a kidnap victim 
could be introduced into evidence). 
65 See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); 
Ashcroft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944). 
66 See Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519 (1968). 
67 See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945). 
68 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307-08 (1963) (citations omitted). 
69 See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940). 
70 Leon v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 770, 772-73 (11th Cir. 1984). 
71 Leon v. Florida, 410 So. 2d 201, 206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (Ferguson, J., dissenting). 
72 Leon, 734 F.2d at 771. 
73 Id. at 772. 
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ransom; the cabdriver’s brother then contacted the police and arranged 
to meet the defendant to give him $4,000 in ransom money.74  At the 
arranged meeting in a parking lot, the defendant pulled a gun on the 
brother, and the police who had accompanied him immediately arrested 
the defendant.75  The police demanded that he tell them where the 
kidnapped victim was being held, and when he refused, “‘he was set 
upon by several of the officers.  They threatened and physically abused 
him by twisting his arm behind his back and choking him until he 
revealed where [the victim] was being held.’”76   
After he provided the information, the police safely recovered the 
victim.77  The defendant was later questioned at the police station by a 
separate group of police officers, and after waiving his right to have 
counsel present, confessed to the kidnapping.78  That incriminating 
statement was later used at trial, though the admissions made to police 
in the parking lot were not used at trial.79  The Eleventh Circuit said that 
the second confession was voluntary, but that the first statement was 
coerced.80  Specifically, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits prosecutorial use of coerced confessions, but 
because the parking lot confession was not used against the defendant, 
there was no violation of his rights.81  The Eleventh Circuit unanimously 
held that, while it does not condone the use of force and coercion by 
police officers,  
this case does not represent the typical case of 
unjustified force.  We did not have an act of brutal law 
enforcement agents trying to obtain a confession in total 
disregard of the law.  This was instead a group of 
concerned officers acting in a reasonable manner to 
obtain information they needed in order to protect 
another individual from bodily harm or death.82  
Additionally, the “violence was not inflicted to obtain a confession 
or provide other evidence to establish appellant’s guilt.  Instead it was 
motivated by the immediate necessity to find the victim and save his 
                                                 
74 Id. at 771. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 772. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 772-73. 
80 Id. at 772. 
81 Id. at 772-73. 
82 Id. at 773. 
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life.”83  Leon is interesting in that it, in effect, condoned the use of torture 
by police under the necessity doctrine—that is, under circumstances 
where it reasonably appears necessary to avert a greater and imminent 
harm.  The ruling effectively allowed the police to engage in torture in 
order to find the kidnapping victim and save him from bodily harm or 
death. 
Similarly, it has been suggested that if a suspect is given immunity 
from prosecution and then tortured into providing information about a 
future terrorist act, his privilege against self-incrimination is not 
violated.84  In this regard, Dershowitz has argued that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination  
does not prohibit any interrogation techniques including 
the use of truth serum or even torture.  The privilege 
only prohibits the introduction into evidence of the fruits of 
such techniques in a criminal trial against the person on 
whom the techniques were used.  Thus, if a confession 
were elicited from a suspect by the use of truth serum or 
torture, that confession—and its fruits—could not be 
used against that suspect.  But it could be used against 
another suspect, or against that suspect in a non-criminal 
case, such as a deportation hearing. 
If a suspect is given “use immunity”—a judicial decree 
announcing in advance that nothing the defendant says 
(or its fruits) can be used against him in a criminal 
case—he can be compelled to answer all proper questions.  
The question then becomes what sorts of pressures can 
constitutionally be used to implement that compulsion.  
We know that he can be imprisoned until he talks.  But 
what if imprisonment is insufficient to compel him to do 
what he has a legal obligation to do?  Can other 
techniques of compulsion be attempted?   
Let’s start with truth serum.  What right would be 
violated if an immunized suspect who refused to 
                                                 
83 Id. at 773 n.5.  In its consideration of this case, the Florida court noted that “we do not 
attempt to resolve the moral and philosophical problem of whether the force used on Leon 
in the emergency, life-threatening situation presented to the arresting officers was 
‘justified’ or ‘proper.’”  Leon, 410 So. 2d at 203 n.3.  Thus, the court viewed the question as a 
moral and philosophical one, rather than a legal issue. 
84 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 44l (l972). 
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comply with his legal obligation to answer questions 
truthfully were compelled to submit to an injection 
which made him do so?  Not his privilege against self-
incrimination, since he has no such privilege now that he 
has been given immunity.  What about his right of 
bodily integrity?  The involuntariness of the injection 
itself does not pose a constitutional barrier.  No less a 
civil libertarian than Justice William J. Brennan rendered 
a decision that permitted an allegedly drunken driver to 
be involuntarily injected in order to remove blood for 
alcohol testing.  Certainly there can be no constitutional 
distinction between an injection that removes a liquid and 
one that injects a liquid.  What about the nature of the 
substance injected?  If it is relatively benign and creates 
no significant health risk, the only issue would be that it 
compels the recipient to do something he doesn’t want 
to do.  But he has a legal obligation to do precisely what 
the serum compels him to do:  answer all questions 
truthfully.85 
On the other hand, several courts have ruled that a Due Process 
violation occurs at the moment coercive questioning overcomes the will 
of the suspect, regardless of whether the evidence is used at trial, based 
on a “shock the conscience” approach.  For example, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that the coercion of a police statement from a 
suspect is not a “full-blown Constitutional violation” of the Due Process 
Clause only when the statement is used against the suspect in court—the 
violation “is complete with the coercive behavior itself.”86  In addition, 
the Supreme Court, in Chavez v. Martinez,87 held that a victim of police 
brutality could bring a cause of action for civil rights violations under the 
Due Process Clause, even though there was no criminal trial.  The 
Court’s decision seems to be based broadly on placing appropriate limits 
on police behavior and with respecting an individual’s dignity and 
autonomy.  Specifically, Justice Kennedy wrote that “it seems to me a 
                                                 
85 DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 53, at 247-48. 
86 Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc). 
Can the coercing by police of a statement from a suspect in custody 
ripen into a full-blown Constitutional violation only if and when the 
statement is tendered and used against the declarant in court?  We 
think not. . . . The due process violation caused by coercive behavior of 
law-enforcement officers in pursuit of a confession is complete with 
the coercive behavior itself. 
Id. 
87 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003). 
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simple enough matter to say that use of torture or its equivalent in an 
attempt to induce a statement violates an individual’s fundamental right 
to liberty of the person.  The Constitution does not countenance the 
official imposition of severe pain or pressure for purposes of 
interrogation.”88  However, in a ticking bomb situation, as distinguished 
from “ordinary” police brutality, it has been argued that “no 
constitutional violation would be found if the circumstances 
surrounding the use of torture were sufficiently compelling.”89 
Another basic question arises:  Is the Eighth Amendment a bar to 
torture?  The simple answer is that the Eighth Amendment’s right to be 
free from “cruel and unusual punishment” applies solely to punishment 
after conviction.90  In the ticking bomb situation, torture would be 
employed against an individual to extract information, not as 
punishment following conviction of an offense. 
V.  THE NECESSITY DOCTRINE AND THE TICKING BOMB SITUATION 
A. An Overview of the Necessity Doctrine   
The doctrine of necessity, with its inevitable weighing of choices-of-
evil, may be stretched to the outer limits in the context of torture.  The 
doctrine holds that certain conduct, though it violates the law and 
produces a harm, is justified because it averts a greater evil and hence 
produces a net social gain or benefit to society.91  Glanville Williams 
expressed the necessity doctrine this way:  “some acts that would 
otherwise be wrong are rendered rightful by a good purpose, or by the 
necessity of choosing the lesser of two evils.”92  He offers this example: 
Suppose that a dike threatens to give way, and the actor 
is faced with the choice of either making a breach in the 
dike, which he knows will result in one or two people 
being drowned, or doing nothing, in which case he 
knows that the dike will burst at another point involving 
a whole town in sudden destruction.  In such a situation, 
                                                 
88 Id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
89 Strauss, supra note 4, at 268. 
90 “An examination of the history of the [Eighth] Amendment and the decisions of this 
Court construing the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment confirms that it 
was designed to protect those convicted of crimes.  We adhere to this longstanding 
limitation . . . .”  Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). 
91 See Joseph J. Simeone, “Survivors” of the Eternal Sea: A Short True Story, 45 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 1123, 1141 (2001). 
92 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 198 (1957). 
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where there is an unhappy choice between the 
destruction of one life and the destruction of many, 
utilitarian philosophy would certainly justify the actor in 
preferring the lesser evil.93  
The utilitarian idea is that certain illegal conduct ought not be punished 
because, due to the special circumstances of the situation, a net benefit to 
society has resulted.  This utilitarian rationale is sometimes criticized as 
“ends-justifying-the-means” because the doctrine allows that, within 
certain limits, it is justifiable to break the letter of the law if doing so will 
produce a net benefit to society.94  Yet another commentator has 
observed:   
[T]hese [justified] acts are ones, as regard which, upon 
balancing all considerations of public policy, it seems 
desirable that they should be encouraged and 
commended even though in each case some individual 
may be injured or the result may be otherwise not 
wholly to be desired.95  
As a result, the necessity doctrine “represents a concession to human 
weakness in cases of extreme pressure, where the accused breaks the law 
rather than submitting to the probability of greater harm if he does not 
break the law.”96  The idea, in its simplest form, is that it is unjust to 
penalize someone for violating the law when the action produces a 
greater good or averts a greater evil.  Had the unlawful action not taken 
place, society would have endured a greater evil than that which 
resulted from violating the law.  English and American courts have long 
recognized the defense of necessity as a common law principle, even in 
                                                 
93 WILLIAMS, supra note 92, at 199-200. 
94 Justice Brandeis in a famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 
(1928), noted: 
In a government of laws, existence of the government would be 
imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. . . .  Crime is 
contagious.  If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds 
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it 
invites anarchy.  To declare that in the administration of the criminal 
law the end justifies the means—to declare that the Government may 
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal—
would bring terrible retribution.  Against that pernicious doctrine this 
Court should resolutely set its face. 
95 JUSTIN MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 189 (West Pub. Co. 1934). 
96 A. J. Ashworth, Reason, Logic and Criminal Liability, 91 L. Q. REV. 102, 106 (1975). 
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the absence of statutory law on the subject.97  Today, many states have 
enacted varying forms of a statutory necessity defense.98  Accordingly, 
with the necessity defense, there will always be a prima facie violation of 
the law.  It might involve the violation of a minor traffic law, with no 
harm caused to life or limb, but the technical violation of the law will 
nonetheless count as a harm to society.  In other instances, the violation 
of law may involve tortious conduct that causes damages to economic or 
property interests.  Or, the violation of law may involve serious criminal 
conduct that results in the maiming of innocent people.  The one 
exception appears to be cases involving intentional homicide.  The 
necessity defense may not be used to justify intentional killing, even if 
the act produces a net saving of lives.  In other words, the doctrine of 
necessity is itself subject to deontological constraints (i.e., with respect to 
intentional homicide).99   
The doctrine of necessity has been expressed in numerous ways, but 
this discussion applies a comprehensive six-prong test that must be met 
in order for someone to invoke the defense.  The defendant must prove 
(1) that he was faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser evil; (2) 
that he acted to prevent imminent harm; (3) that he reasonably 
anticipated a causal relationship between his conduct and the harm to be 
avoided; and (4) that there were no other legal alternatives to violating 
                                                 
97 Edward B. Arnolds & Norman F. Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law: The 
Right To Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289, 291-96 (1974). 
98 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.320 (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-604 (2004); COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-702 (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,§ 463 (2001); HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 703-302 (LexisNexis 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.030 (West 2003); MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 563.026 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-2 (West 2004); N.Y. PENAL LAW  § 
35.05 (McKinney 2004); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.22 (Vernon 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
939.47 (West 2003). 
99 See, e.g., Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 286-87 (1884).  The Court held 
that nothing can justify intentionally killing an “innocent,” “unoffending” individual, 
unless the killing can be justified by some well-recognised excuse 
admitted by the law.  It is further admitted that there was in this case 
no such excuse, unless the killing was justified by what has been called 
“necessity.”  But the temptation to the act which existed here was not 
what the law has ever called necessity.  Nor is this to be regretted. 
See also, R.I. Recreation Ctr., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1949) 
(stating that “It appears to be established . . . that . . . necessity will never excuse taking the 
life of an innocent person . . . .”).  But see United States v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 360 
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (Case No. 15,383).  This is the only case in Anglo-American law that 
explicitly suggests, in dictum, that the necessity defense might be appropriately invoked in 
the killing of innocents where an imminent danger threatens the entire group with death, 
provided a fair method of sacrifice is employed.  Id.  However, the court held that, in this 
case the necessity defense did not apply to the facts.  Id. 
Cohan: Torture and the Necessity Doctrine
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
1610 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
the law.100  Additionally, the fifth factor is that “the Legislature has not 
acted to preclude the defense by a clear and deliberate choice regarding 
the values at issue.”101  Finally, a sixth factor is that the necessitous 
circumstances were not caused by the negligent or reckless acts of the 
defendant in the first instance.102  Courts generally require that all  
factors be proven in order for the defendant to succeed in the necessity 
defense.103   
Courts generally require that all of the factors be proven in order for 
the defendant to succeed in invoking the necessity defense.  A further 
consideration is what standard will apply in assessing the existence of a 
given factor.  In evaluating the individual elements of the necessity 
doctrine, if a jury is impaneled, much depends on jury instructions.104  
For instance, if the judge instructs the jury to construe the second 
factor—the imminence factor—to require evidence that the threatened 
harm was imminent in fact, the defendant might be found culpable if the 
situation was a “false alarm.”  On the other hand, if the instruction is to 
                                                 
100 United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 693 (9th Cir. 1989). 
101 Commonwealth v. Brugmann, 433 N.E.2d 457, 461 (Mass. 1982); see also Missouri v. 
Diener, 706 S.W.2d 582, 585 (1986) (quoting same language). 
102 See, e.g., United States v. Agard, 605 F.2d 665, 667 (2d Cir. 1979).  “[D]efendant must 
show . . . that defendant had not recklessly or negligently placed himself in a situation in 
which it was probable that he would be forced to choose the criminal conduct].”  Id. 
103 In this discussion of torture to these six factors are referred to as follows: (1) the 
choice-of-evils factor; (2) the imminence factor; (3) the causal nexus factor; (4) the legal way 
out factor; (5) the preemption factor; and (6) the clean hands factor. 
104 One author has opined that the question of justification in torture situations is simply 
too complex for juries to decide: 
Allowing juries to make decisions about justification would have the 
disadvantage of inconsistency.  Two different juries, judging the same 
torture case, might well come to differing conclusions about whether 
torture was warranted in that particular circumstance.  They might 
come to this conclusion not because they come to different conclusions 
with respect to the facts, but rather because they have different views 
about whether a certain act was truly justified.  Some jurors might 
think that torture is never justified, or is justified only when it is 
necessary to stop a nuclear scale attack.  Other jurors might be willing 
to see a suspect tortured even to save one life, or perhaps even an 
unoccupied building if the suspect is unsympathetic enough.  Jurors 
might also have highly variant views about which methods of torture 
are worse than others, and therefore are less permissible except in the 
most extreme circumstances.  Some jurors might be swayed by horror 
at the fact that a government agent used his authority to inflict extreme 
pain on a captive, while others might be more concerned with the 
innocent life that agent was trying to save. 
Raviv, supra note 2, at 176. 
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decide whether the threat reasonably appeared to be imminent, the 
defendant would be in a better position to assert the necessity defense. 
Courts almost always scrutinize the facts based on the balance of 
human reason in light of all the relevant circumstances.  The actor must 
entertain a reasonable belief in the necessity of his conduct.  The 
reasonableness standard ensures that a jury, in evaluating the 
defendant’s action, shares the actor’s evaluation of the necessitous 
circumstances.  This standard has been expressed as follows: 
While an accused’s perceptions of the surrounding facts 
may be highly relevant in determining whether his 
conduct should be excused, those perceptions remain 
relevant only so long as they are reasonable.  The 
accused person must, at the time of the act, honestly 
believe, on reasonable grounds, that he faces a situation 
of imminent peril that leaves no reasonable legal 
alternative open.  There must be a reasonable basis for 
the accused’s beliefs and actions. but it would be proper 
to take into account circumstances that legitimately 
affect the accused person’s ability to evaluate the 
situation.  The test cannot be a subjective one, and the 
accused who argues that he perceived imminent peril 
without an alternative would only succeed with the 
defence of necessity if his belief was reasonable given his 
circumstances and attributes.105  
Under this standard, it is not sufficient if an interrogator subjectively 
believes that an act of torture is necessary to prevent a greater evil.106  
Under the reasonableness standard, an actor must reasonably construe 
that there is an actual, imminent threat in the first place and, in making a 
choice–of-evils, that one evil was greater than the other.  The threat need 
not be an actual threat, provided that the actor has a well-founded belief 
that impending harm will result unless he takes steps to avert it.107  The 
                                                 
105 Regina v. Latimer, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3, at ¶ 33 (Can.) (emphasis added). 
106 See Tom Stacy, Acts, Omissions, and the Necessity of Killing Innocents, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
481, 518 (2002). 
107 See, e.g., United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 14, 470) 
(Story, J.) (involving a group of sailors charged with mutiny).  The defendants sought to 
justify mutiny on the grounds that their ship was not seaworthy.  Id.  The court instructed 
the jury “that the defendants ought not to be found guilty, if they acted bona fide upon 
reasonable grounds of belief that the ship was unseaworthy . . . .”  Id. at 874.  The court said 
that if in fact the crew was mistaken as to the un-seaworthiness of the ship, the jury could 
determine whether, nonetheless, the crew was reasonable in holding its belief and in taking 
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balancing of evils “cannot, of course, be committed to the private 
judgment of the actor, but must, in most cases, be determined at trial 
with due regard being given for the crime charged and the higher value 
sought to be achieved.”108  A person’s conduct will not be excused by 
necessity merely because he thought it served a “higher value.”109  
1. The Choice-of-Evils Factor   
The threshold factor is whether employing torture is, in fact, the 
lesser evil in a ticking bomb situation.  A deontologist might argue that it 
is by no means clear that torture would be a “lesser evil,” even in a 
ticking bomb case, in light of the severe effects of these measures on the 
interrogee.  Putting that towards one side, one might consider these 
issues:  the number of lives at risk, the availability of other means to 
acquire the information, the degree of force to be used, and the 
likelihood that the suspect has the relevant information.  Obviously, the 
greater the number of lives at risk, the more the choice-of-evils weighs in 
favor of torturing the suspect.110 
                                                                                                             
action in accordance with that reasonable belief.  Id.  The jury could acquit if it found that 
the crew, “having acted upon their best judgment fairly, and in a case where respectable, 
intelligent, and impartial witnesses should assert, that they should have done the 
same . . . .”  Id. 
108 Vermont v. Warshow, 410 A.2d 1000, 1003 (Vt. 1979). 
109 Glanville Williams, Necessity, 1978 CRIM. L. REV. 128, 134. 
110 Mirko Bagaric and Julie Clarke have devised a kind of algorithm in evaluating 
whether a particular situation warrants the use of torture: 
[T]he strength of the case in favor of torture can be mapped as follows: 
 
W+L+P 
TxO 
 
Where: 
 
W = whether the agent is the wrongdoer 
L = the number of lives that will be lost if the information is not 
provided 
P = the probability that the agent has the relevant knowledge 
T = the time available before the disaster will occur (“immediacy of the 
harm”) 
O = the likelihood that other inquiries will forestall the risk 
 
Torture should be permitted where the application of the variables 
exceeds a threshold level.  Once beyond this level, the higher the figure 
the more severe the forms of torture that are permissible. 
Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 2, at 614. 
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The degree of force to be used and the degree of the suspect’s 
culpability are interrelated.  For instance, one needs to analyze the 
degree of force in light of the degree of the suspect’s ability to provide 
the relevant information in order to properly assess the choice-of-evils.  
How certain is it that this suspect knows where the bomb is?  How 
agonizing would the torture be?  Would less extreme methods likely 
work on this individual?  
Some individuals are highly immune to physical interrogation, yet 
they may possess the information being sought to avert an imminent 
terrorist attack.  In such an instance, is it justified to use extreme torture 
rather than more moderate types of physical abuse?  Would it be 
acceptable to torture the suspect’s child in his presence, hoping to get the 
suspect to disclose where a detonating device has been planted?  How 
many lives would need to be in jeopardy before you might say “Yes”?  If 
one million lives would be saved?  One might keep in mind that the 
utilitarian underpinning of the necessity doctrine permits just about any 
preventive action, no matter how severe, short of intentional homicide, 
as long as the other elements are satisfied. 
Another issue in assessing the choice-of-evils is the impact that the 
use of torture might have on the psyche of society as a whole.  A 
deontologist would argue that there would be a significant harm to 
society if it were to endorse and engage in torture, and hence there 
would be a net loss of social goods.  “Specifically, the inability of the 
United States to maintain the moral high ground both in its fight against 
terrorism and in its fight against torture and human rights abuses 
around the world must be part of the calculus . . . .”111  
Another concern in the choice-of-evils analysis is that officials could 
become desensitized to the moral objectionability of torture once it is 
employed and that torture erodes the humanity of those who are the 
torturers.  However, the threat of terrorist attacks is a rare occurrence, 
and it may be exceedingly rare that a ticking bomb case would become a 
reality.  Thus, a typical official very likely would never actually face the 
choice of whether to torture a suspect. 
Also weighing in the balance is that if we use torture, then we 
should not be surprised if our enemies mistreat our citizens who might 
be taken as hostages or prisoners in reliance on the precedent we have 
set, or use that precedent to justify their own conduct.  Indeed, we have 
                                                 
111 Strauss, supra note 4, at 268-69. 
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seen just such a tit-for-tat sort of case in June, 2004, when, in the wake of 
the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal, Islamist militants abducted Paul 
M. Johnson, an American working in Saudi Arabia, in order to inflict the 
same abuse that had been inflicted on Iraqi detainees.  His captors 
subsequently beheaded Johnson in a gruesome video distributed 
worldwide.112 Dershowitz acknowledges that, “Inevitably, the 
legitimation of torture by the world’s leading democracy would provide 
a welcome justification for its more widespread use in other parts of the 
world.”113  In addition, the Israeli-Palestinian experience has shown that, 
in the long-term, torture is an ineffective method to prevent terrorism, as 
it increases hostility and the justifications for torture also justify 
terrorism. 114  Thus, it is important to consider the reality that “torture 
creates resentments, fears, and hatreds that, in the long run, are far more 
destructive than any evil it might avoid.”115 
Another consideration under the choice-of-evils factor involves the 
slippery slope problem:  even if the act of torture will likely save many 
lives, it ought not be employed because of the slippery slope effect that 
leads to abuse in less dire cases.  There is the danger that, once 
introduced, the government will resort to torture in ever increasing 
circumstances; there is no convenient stopping point.  While no one 
would seriously endorse the wholesale use of torture, once torture is 
legitimized in some cases, many unjustified acts of torture are likely to 
occur.116 
Torture might actually become formally institutionalized and 
become the norm rather than the exception.  According to Amnesty 
                                                 
112 See Craig Whitlock, Islamic Militants Behead American in Saudi Arabia, WASH. POST, June 
20, 2004, at A6. 
113 DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 53, at 145. 
114 See Barak Cohen, Democracy and the Mis-rule of Law: The Israeli Legal System’s Failure To 
Prevent Torture in the Occupied Territories, 12 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 75, 90 (2001) 
(quoting in part Sanford H. Kadish, Torture, the State and the Individual, 23 ISR. L. REV. 345, 
353 (1989)). 
On a long-term view, torture fails to prevent terrorism because it 
builds hostility in the Palestinians of the Territories, encouraging them 
to support and pursue terrorism.  Also, the very rationale used to 
justify torture, mutatis mutandis, justifies terrorism.  As Sanford H. 
Kadish noted, “[i]f the norm to prevail for torture and other cruel 
treatment is that it may be justified if the evils to be avoided are great 
and significant enough, how can a similar qualification be denied to 
the resort to acts of terrorism?” 
Id. 
115 Louis Michael Seidman, Torture’s Truth, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 881, 893 (2005). 
116 See Cohen, supra note 114, at 91. 
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International, torture tends to become entrenched in a bureaucracy and 
becomes “administrative practice”—a routine procedure 
institutionalized into the method of governing.117  If torture is allowed 
for one purpose, then why not extend its use to other high-stake 
purposes, or even in ordinary criminal cases, where a suspect in custody 
clearly has critical information, but refuses to provide it through 
ordinary interrogation?  For instance, why not use torture on someone 
who likely knows the name or whereabouts of a serial killer?  It may 
come to be used for minor purposes or used when not actually necessary 
and the bureaucracy’s existence may depend upon frequent use of the 
practice.  In other words, “the legitimization of repugnant practices in 
special cases inevitably loosens antipathy to them in all cases,” and 
“[w]hen torture is no longer unthinkable, it will be thought about.”118  
Richard Posner has noted: 
If rules are promulgated permitting torture in defined 
circumstances, some officials are bound to want to 
explore the outer bounds of the rules.  Having been 
regularized, the practice will become regular.  Better to 
leave in place the formal and customary prohibitions, 
but with the understanding that they will not be 
enforced in extreme circumstances.119  
To counter these concerns, Dershowitz suggests that the slippery slope 
concern can be abated by insuring that torture would be “limited by 
acceptable principles of morality”—that is, its use would be constrained 
by some sort of “principled break.”120 
But another slippery slope concern is that the sheer brutality of 
torture techniques might escalate. If nonlethal torture of one person is 
justified in an extreme case, then what if it became necessary to use lethal 
torture, or torture that poses a substantial risk of death?  What is to limit 
the candidate of torture to the suspect himself—why not torture the 
suspect’s mother or threaten to kill his family, friends, or compatriots?  
This prospect is not merely hypothetical; a former CIA officer suggested 
that the CIA should consider targeting close relatives of known terrorists 
as a means to coerce intelligence from the terrorists.  “You get their 
                                                 
117 See AMNESTY INT’L, REPORT ON ALLEGATIONS OF TORTURE IN BRAZIL (Amnesty Int’l 
Publ’n. 3d. ed. 1976). 
118 Kadish, supra note 114, at 353. 
119 Richard Posner, The Best Offense, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 2002, at 28 (book review). 
120 DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 53, at 147. 
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mothers and their brothers and their sisters under your complete control, 
and then you make that known to the target . . . . You imply or you 
directly threaten [that] his family is going to pay the price if he makes 
the wrong decision.”121  
2. The Imminence of Harm Factor   
Imminence signifies some sort of immediacy of the threat, but how 
immediate must be the threat to be “imminent” in order to justify 
torture?  What if the ticking bomb is to go off not within a day or so, but 
within the month?  Or a week?  The imminence requirement generally 
means that the threatened harm is something that is temporally quite 
proximate to the present moment.  Bentham alludes to the imminence 
factor in saying that torture “ought not to be employed but in cases 
which admit of no delay; in cases in which if the thing done were not 
done immediately there is a certainty, at least a great probability, that the 
doing it would not answer the purpose.”122   
If the threat is not imminent, then there is time to employ traditional 
methods of law enforcement and other reasonable legal means to 
uncover the pertinent facts.  However, the question of imminence must 
be construed in light of the gravity of the harm to be averted.  If the 
gravity of the threat is enormous, such as a ticking nuclear bomb that 
may kill many thousands of people, the threat may be days away, but 
the gravity of the threat may justify extreme measures now.  On this 
point, a report by a national commission in Israel, known as the Landau 
Commission Report, explored in Part VI.B, determined that it may be 
justifiable to employ torture to discover the location of a bomb, whether 
it is set to explode in five minutes or five days.123   
3. The Causal Nexus Factor   
Under this factor, the action taken must be reasonably calculated to 
be causally effective in averting the greater evil.  Bentham posed the 
causal nexus factor this way:  “Even on occasions which admit not of 
delay, [torture] ought not to be employed but in Cases where the benefit 
produced by the doing of the thing required is such as can warrant the 
                                                 
121 Bob Drogin and Greg Miller, Spy Agencies Facing Questions of Tactics, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 
28, 2001, § 1, at 1 (internal quotations omitted). 
122 Twining & Twining, supra note 8, at 313. 
123 See Mordecai Kremnitzer, The Landau Commission Report—Was the Security Service 
Subordinated to the Law, or the Law to the ”Needs” of the Security Service?, 23 ISR. L. REV. 216, 
253 (1989). 
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employing of so extreme a remedy.”124  If there is a minimal likelihood of 
success from torture and less intrusive, lawful investigative techniques 
are available, then the utility of torture under the necessity doctrine 
cannot be sustained.  
A consideration under this factor is whether the suspect has it in his 
power to provide the desired information.  To some extent, this overlaps 
with the choice-of-evils factor where this Article suggests considering the 
degree of certainty that authorities believe that the suspect has the 
needed information in assessing whether torture is the lesser evil.  If the 
suspect admits to planting the bomb, but refuses to disclose its location, 
that would seem to be a pretty high level of certainty that the suspect has 
it in his power to disclose the relevant information.  But if authorities 
have a mere suspicion without a lot to back it up, we have an entirely 
different situation. 
On this point, Jeremy Bentham said: 
There seem to be two Cases in which Torture may with 
propriety be applied. 
1. The first is where the thing which a Man is required to 
do being a thing which the public has an interest in his 
doing, is a thing which for a certainty is in his power to 
do; and which therefore so long as he continues to suffer 
for not doing he is sure not to be innocent. 
2. The second is where a man is required what probably 
though not certainly it is in his power to do; and for the 
not doing of which it is possible that he may suffer, 
although he be innocent; but which the public has so 
great an interest in his doing that the danger of what 
may ensue from his not doing it is a greater danger than 
even that of an innocent person’s suffering the greatest 
degree of pain that can be suffered by Torture, of the 
kind and in the quantity permitted to be employed.125  
                                                 
124 Twining & Twining, supra note 8, at 313. 
125 Id. at 312-13. 
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Bentham goes on to say that torture “ought not to be employed without 
good proof of its being in the power of the prisoner to do what is 
required of him.”126 
There is a difference of opinion as to the causal efficacy of torture, 
even if the suspect has the necessary information.  The pain and stress of 
torture make it almost impossible for an ordinary individual to endure 
without caving in to the interrogators.  Much depends on the degree of 
torture, ranging from discomfort to ill treatment to intolerable pain.  
Each person has his own pain threshold, his own psychological make-
up, and his own cultural conditioning.  Of course, history is replete with 
instances of victims who would not be broken under the threat of or 
actual use of torture.  One notable example consists of the individuals 
who, during the second and third centuries, were persecuted and 
tortured to death for refusing to renounce Christianity.127  What if the 
suspect, once subjected to torture, does not capitulate?  If the torture fails 
to be causally effective in getting the crucial information, would it be 
appropriate to go one step beyond—to take a child of the suspect and 
torture him or her in front of the suspect? 
Another concern related to the causal nexus factor is whether 
information gained through torture is reliable.  One objection to torture 
is that torture is inefficient; it produces false confessions and wrong 
information.  If torture is ineffective in gaining accurate information, 
then the causal connection between torture and averting a greater evil is 
gone.  Many believe that torture tactics often raise such reliability 
questions.128  A spokesman for Human Rights Watch has said that 
torture in the United States is uncommon because it lacks causal efficacy.  
“Law enforcement professionals in this country understand that torture 
is a wonderful technique for getting confessions from innocent people 
                                                 
126 See id. at 313. 
127 See, e.g., ELAINE PAGELS, THE GNOSTIC GOSPELS 70-101 (1979). 
128 See Strauss, supra note 4, at 261-65 (numerous torture opponents have argued that 
torture seldom works); see, e.g., Philip B. Heymann, Torture Should Not Be Authorized, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 2002, at A15 (“Torture is a prescription for losing a war for support 
of our beliefs in the hope of reducing the casualties from relatively small battles.”); Peter 
Maass, Torture, Tough or Lite: If a Terror Suspect Won’t Talk, Should He Be Made To?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at D4 (“[M]any terrorism experts believe that in the long run torture is 
a losing strategy.”); Alisa Solomon, The Case Against Torture, VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 4, 2001, at 
56 (citing a CIA training manual and a study of Argentina’s dirty war for the proposition 
that torture is ineffective). 
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and a lousy technique for getting truth out of guilty people.”129  It seems 
intuitive that most people subjected to torture will say virtually anything 
to stop the pain. 
Long-term inefficiencies of torture have been noted with the British 
experience in Ireland and the French experience in Algeria.130  In Algeria, 
for example, while the French military defeated terrorists in the Battle of 
Algiers through the widespread use of torture, such resentment was 
engendered that there was great difficulty in establishing peace 
thereafter.131 
Others have argued that torture simply does not work in most cases.  
An individual subject to extreme physical and mental abuse will talk, but 
what they say will not be reliable.  A person will say anything in these 
circumstances, but not necessarily the truth.132  Even the CIA has 
acknowledged that torture is not effective in ferreting out the truth.133  
On the other hand, many think torture is in fact reliable, as 
“[h]umans have an intense desire to avoid pain,” and thus will “comply 
with the demands of a torturer to avoid the pain.” 134  Some think that 
the use of torture has successfully coerced Palestinian terrorists into 
revealing information that has directly prevented further acts of 
terrorism.135  In 1995, Filipino authorities used torture and obtained 
information that enabled them to thwart the hijacking and destruction of 
eleven airliners.136  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Israel, in its 
opinion that disallowed the use of torture of terrorism suspects, 
                                                 
129 Eric Schmitt, There Are Ways To Make Them Talk, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, § 4, at 1 
(quoting Tom Malinowski, Human Rights Watch spokesman) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
130 See id. 
131 See id. 
132 Strauss, supra note 4, at 261. 
133 See Tim Werner, CIA Taught, Then Dropped Mental Torture in Latin America, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 29, 1997, at A1. 
134 Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 2, at 588-89. 
The main benefit of torture is that it is an excellent means of gathering 
information.  Humans have an intense desire to avoid pain, no matter 
how short term, and most will comply with the demands of a torturer 
to avoid the pain.  Often the threat of torture alone will evoke 
cooperation. 
Id. 
135 See Cohen, supra note 114, at 90. 
136 See Matthew Brzezinski, Bust and Boom: Six Years Before September 11 Attacks, Philippine 
Police Took Down an al Qaeda Cell that Had Been Plotting, Among Other Things, To Fly 
Explosives-Laden Planes into the Pentagon—and Possibly Some Skyscrapers, WASH. POST, Dec. 
30, 2001, at W09. 
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discussed in Part VI.B, said that the severe shaking of suspected 
terrorists by the Israeli General Security Services cannot be prohibited 
“without seriously harming the GSS’ ability to effectively thwart deadly 
terrorist attacks.  Its use in the past has lead to the thwarting of 
murderous attacks.”137   
Similarly, a senior Pentagon civilian lawyer stated that intense 
interrogation techniques were necessary with respect to a Saudi Arabian 
detainee who was believed to be the planned twentieth hijacker in the 
September 11 terrorist plot.  The situation was one of “some urgency” in 
that he likely “had information that the people at Guantanamo believed 
was important, not just about perhaps 9/11, but about future events.”138  
This particular detainee ended up providing information about a 
planned attack and about financial networks to fund terrorist 
operations.139 
Is it worth the risk that false information will be elicited by the 
tortured subject?  Given the potential unreliability of information 
obtained from torture, the worst that could happen is that the inevitable 
conflagration will still happen despite law enforcement’s best efforts to 
secure needed information.  But because torture has worked at times in 
the past, there will ultimately be similar successes in the future.140 
4. The Legal Way Out Factor   
This factor requires a showing that there is no reasonable legal 
alternative to avert the greater evil.  In order for torture to pass scrutiny 
under the necessity doctrine, other reasonable alternatives would need to 
be deployed, if time permits.  The legal way out factor is associated with 
the imminence factor—that is, if the necessitous circumstance is truly 
imminent, there may be no time in which to pursue legal alternatives.  
                                                 
137 The case is reported as The Public Committee Against Torture in H.C. 5100/94, Israel 
v. Israel, [1999].  See Supreme Court of Israel: Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General 
Security Service’s Interrogation Methods, 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1475 (1999) [hereinafter GSS Torture 
Case]. 
138 See David Johnston & Thom Shanker, Pentagon Approved Intense Interrogation 
Techniques for Sept. 11 Suspect at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2004, at A10 (internal 
quotations omitted). 
139 See id. 
140 Strauss, supra note 4, at 263.  For example, Jordan broke the famous terrorist Abu 
Nidel by threatening his family.  Id. at n.212.  The Philippines reportedly cracked the 1993 
World Trade Center bombings by convincing a suspect that they would turn him over to 
the Israelis.  Id.  And in 1995, the Philippines state police turned the testicles, and broke the 
ribs of one al Qaeda agent who, after two weeks, was broken and revealed a plot to hijack 
eleven aircraft.  Id. 
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However, if the danger is not imminent, Bentham suggests that “a 
method of compulsion apparently less severe and therefore less 
unpopular ought to be employed in preference.”141  Obviously, if the 
danger to be averted is so imminent that there is no time to explore less 
intrusive techniques, interrogators may determine that torture is, under 
the circumstances, the only reasonable means of averting the greater evil.   
Alternatives, such as offering a bribe, other incentives, or 
psychological strategies might also be considered.  Interrogators might 
consider the less painful alternative of injecting the suspect with “truth 
serum.”142  The use of truth serum or other mind-altering substances 
may well be legal under United States law, unless the use of the 
substance produces “prolonged mental harm.”143  In any event, “a 
significant number of subjects retain the ability to dissemble while under 
the influence of truth serum” and these substances cannot ensure the 
accuracy of the information obtained.144  Other commentators also argue 
against the causal efficacy of truth serum, saying that while drugs make 
suspects chatty, there is more evidence that they are simply “chirruping 
on” rather than telling the truth and that there is lack of scientific 
evidence of the reliability of confessions elicited under so-called truth 
serum.145  Still, the use of truth serum lacks the painfulness and, under 
the United States interpretation of the U.N. Convention, it is a permitted 
technique.  Short of torture, “[w]here the stakes are sufficiently high, and 
where other methods have proven unsuccessful, even a relatively 
modest chance of discovering useful information might very well be 
                                                 
141 Twining & Twining, supra note 8, at 313. 
142 See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 322 (1963).  The drug, hyoscine, as well as the 
drug, scopolamine, are familiarly known as “truth serum.”  Id. 
143 As mentioned in Part III.D, the definition of torture under 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2), the 
infliction of “severe mental pain or suffering,” requires that it be “prolonged” in duration, 
and the definition explicitly prohibits “the administration or application, or threatened 
administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated 
to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality . . . .” 
 For an argument that the use of truth serum cannot be considered “prolonged mental 
harm,” and therefore cannot be construed as torture, see Odeshoo, supra note 2, at 201.  The 
author concludes that “neither international law nor U.S. law categorically bars the United 
States from using truth serum for intelligence-gathering purposes in its efforts to combat 
terrorism.”  Id. at 253.  However, another commentator argues that torture should 
encompass the mental harm caused by truth serum used for the purpose of coercing the 
divulgence of information.  See generally Keller, supra note 2, at 521. 
144 Odeshoo, supra note 2, at 215. 
145 See Strauss, supra note 4, at 262 n.209. 
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regarded as sufficient to justify the use of such interrogation methods,” 
including for example, truth serum.146  
As mentioned in Part IV.C, Dershowitz asserts that if a suspect is 
given immunity from prosecution, then the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination does not prohibit the use of truth serum or 
even torture.  Thus, if the use of truth serum to interrogate a suspect 
does not violate substantive due process rights, this could be a 
reasonable legal alternative to torture.  The evidence may not be used in 
court, but the suspect’s civil rights might not be considered to be 
violated—in contrast with straightforward, physical torture.147  That is 
perhaps because the injection of truth serum is minimally invasive, 
involves almost no pain or deleterious side effects, and simply lowers a 
person’s inhibitions.148  If this reasonable legal alternative does not result 
in information sought, then the interrogation may have no other course 
but to proceed with torture. 
5. The Preemption Factor   
One might argue that the necessity doctrine is unavailable because 
the issue of the use of torture has been settled by a deliberate legislative 
choice in the international community, evidenced by the various 
conventions mentioned above that make torture illegal under any 
circumstances.  This deontological principle, being part of customary 
international law, is in effect a deliberate legislative determination that 
preempts the matter.  The fact that numerous states, both signators and 
nonsignators to these conventions, violate this norm does not detract 
from the deontological language of these conventions any more than the 
fact that some people commit murder suggests that the law of homicide 
“admits” of some exceptions.  The situation seems to be much the same 
as the “preemption” indicated in cases that have disallowed the 
necessity defense in the context of intentional homicide, even though the 
act saved a greater number of lives.149  Inasmuch as the torture 
conventions specifically state that war or other exigencies offer no 
justification for torture, it appears that the issue has been “preempted” 
                                                 
146 Odeshoo, supra note 2, at 216. 
147 See Strauss, supra note 4, at 237.  It has been suggested that the use of truth serum 
might require, under the Fourth Amendment, that police obtain a search warrant based 
upon probable cause to believe the individual has relevant information important for 
averting a terrorist plot.  See id. at 238 n.133. 
148 See id. at 238. 
149 See R.I. Recreation Center, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 
1949); United States v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (Case No. 15,383); 
Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273, 286 (1884). 
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by statutes that address the subject.  Under the preemption notion of the 
necessity defense, it seems that this factor precludes justifying the use of 
torture under any circumstances. 
It seems likely that if officials are faced with a ticking bomb case, 
they will engage in torture knowing full well it is considered to be a 
deontological constraint under international law, with the only question 
being whether it will be done openly, pursuant to some legal protocol if 
one is in place, or in a clandestine manner.  A former CIA agent with 
thirty years of experience stated, “A lot of people are saying we need 
someone at the agency who can pull fingernails out.  Others are saying, 
Let others use interrogation methods that we don’t use.  The only 
question then is, do you want to have CIA people in the room?”150  The 
preemption factor is probably the most important hurdle for one to 
overcome in connection with arguing that necessity is a justification or 
excuse for torture in certain exigent circumstances. 
6. The Clean Hands Factor   
The clean hands factor seems intuitive:  if the actor has in some way 
been responsible for bringing about the necessitous circumstances, the 
necessity defense may not be interposed.  A blameworthy actor ought 
not be able to invoke necessity if he recklessly assumed the risk of a 
terrible predicament in which a choice-of-evils might develop.  Suppose 
someone is speeding down a narrow alley.  Suddenly he sees a group of 
people; it is too late to stop.  He can avoid killing them if he veers into an 
adjacent shop, where a shopkeeper is rearranging a window display.  
The driver turns his car into the shop window, killing the owner, but 
thereby saves the lives of the group of people ahead.  He defends a 
charge of vehicular homicide by pleading necessity in that he made a 
reasonable choice-of-evils and, if he had not driven into the shop, he 
would have killed many more people.  While we may approve of his 
quick thinking that resulted in killing one person in the shop instead of 
the five in the alley, it still seems counterintuitive for a defendant to be 
acquitted for vehicular manslaughter based on necessity where his 
overall recklessness caused the circumstances that occasioned the choice-
of-evils.  Intuitively, the defense seems wrong in such a case because it 
was the defendant’s recklessness that established the Hobson’s choice in 
                                                 
150 DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS, supra note 53, at 151 (quoting an unnamed CIA 
agent) (internal quotations omitted). 
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the first place.151  The choice-of-evils might mitigate the sentence, but not 
acquit the actor from the crime. 
To cite another example, suppose someone negligently starts a brush 
fire and, in order to prevent it from spreading to a town, he destroys 
someone’s house to clear the way for a firebreak.  It seems intuitive that 
the actor ought not be able to defend an action in tort for damages to the 
structure he destroyed, even though he did succeed in preventing the 
fire from spreading to an area where it would have produced greater 
harm.  
Many terrorists operate under the belief that they have “clean 
hands”—that is, that they are not responsible for bringing about the state 
of affairs that have pushed them to launch attacks on us.  They believe 
that they are truly innocent of any wrongdoing—that the evil to be 
averted is wholly outside of themselves—such things as imperialism, 
hegemony, imposition of Western values, etc.  Terrorists may perceive 
that they are faced with a significant form of injustice or oppression by a 
powerful political enemy, that an act of terrorism is necessary to avert 
this harm because there is no other remedy, and that the act would be, 
on balance, the lesser evil.  Furthermore, to a terrorist, there is no such 
thing as an “innocent target” in the enemy population, and thus civilians 
and other “innocent” targets are fair game against the offending 
government.  From the terrorist’s perspective, the targets are not truly 
innocent, but are collectively guilty of their government’s policies.  
Terrorists may believe that they are not the initial aggressors, but that the 
enemy government’s imperialism constitutes unlawful violence and 
aggression against their fundamental rights, and that terrorist action is 
the only reasonable means of fending off the offending government and 
overcoming tyranny. 
According to R.M. Hare, terrorists are “acting on behalf of an 
oppressed section of the population which has absolutely no alternative 
means of securing redress of its just grievances.  Such people might claim 
that they were prepared to have anybody do the same to them in a like 
case.”152  As Hare points out, however, the question is what counts as 
“just grievances.”153  Specifically, it will be necessary to show that there 
were no other feasible means for the resolution of grievances.154  Thus, to 
                                                 
151 Leo Katz, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF 
THE LAW 42 (1996). 
152 R.M. Hare, On Terrorism, 13 J. VALUE INQUIRY 241, 244 (1979). 
153 Id. at 244-45. 
154 Id. 
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terrorists, the clean hands factor is fully complied with—they have clean 
hands, and thus they are not the source of the evil that they seek to 
eradicate. 
The various elements of the necessity defense make it extremely 
difficult for authorities to justify or excuse the use of torture, even when 
extremely exigent circumstances exist.  That does not mean that 
authorities would refrain from the use of torture in a ticking bomb 
situation.  Still, the international consensus that torture is wrong appears 
to have risen to the status of customary international law.  Thus, it would 
apply to all state actors, and “necessity” would not be a justification or 
excuse for its violation.  In the final analysis, states will take such action 
as they deem necessary, where exigent circumstances exist that under 
ordinarily would not be considered.   
VI.  MODERN INSTANCES OF TORTURE BY THE FRENCH AND THE ISRAELIS 
A. The French Experience in the Use of Torture Against the Algerians   
Application of the necessity doctrine in the context of torture is a 
reality.  Not surprisingly, occasions arise where interrogators are 
tempted to use torture as a lesser evil in an effort to avert a greater evil—
future terrorist acts.  
A well known example of the extensive use of torture was by the 
French army during its brutal anti-colonial war in Algeria from 1955 to 
1957.  An estimated one million Algerians were killed in their anti-
colonial struggle against France.155  During that period, the French 
committed more than half a million troops to repress the Algerian 
rebellion.156  The army was left more or less to its own devices and 
torture and other atrocities became widespread.157  Some of the torture 
consisted of applying electrodes to various parts of the body and 
wrapping a wet towel around the person’s face until they choked and 
vomited.158 
French soldiers also committed many rapes of Algerian women.  
Some tens of thousands of Algerians who fought on the side of the 
French during the war were later abandoned by the French and 
                                                 
155 See Richard Deaton, Western Colonial Terrorism Makes bin Laden Look Tame, THE 
OTTAWA CITIZEN, Dec. 10, 2001, at A13. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 See 60 Minutes Transcript, 34 BURRELL’S INFO. SERV. PUB., Jan. 20, 2002, at 6-7. 
Cohan: Torture and the Necessity Doctrine
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
1626 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
massacred when the French pulled out.  France never apologized for its 
conduct in the war,159 and in 2000, the French Prime Minister, Lionel 
Jospin, ruled out a parliamentary inquiry into the torture committed by 
the French army during the Algerian war.160  An officer who supervised 
the torture, General Paul Aussaresses, wrote a memoir, Algeria Special 
Services 1955-1957, narrating his cold-blooded use of torture and how he 
summarily executed twenty-four men.161  In the book, the General gives 
chilling details about how and why he tortured prisoners and says that 
almost all who were interrogated were killed, whether or not they 
talked.162  No one was tried for war crimes in connection with this 
matter.  However, once the General’s book came out in France, he was 
prosecuted, not for his acts of supervising torture, but under an obscure 
French law that made it a crime to try and justify war, which the 
prosecutor argued was evidenced by the General seeking to reveal the 
facts of the episode to the public.163  The General was fined $6,500.164  
The trial focused almost exclusively on passages singled out from 
the General’s memoir.165  In a passage of his book quoted in court, the 
General wrote, “‘The best way to make a terrorist talk when he refused 
to say what he knew was to torture him.’  ‘I was indifferent.  They had to 
be killed; that’s all there was to it.’”166  In addition, the General said in 
court, “‘Alas, torture does serve a purpose.  And today I would do the 
same thing again if I had a bin Laden in my hands’ . . . ”167  The General, 
age 83 at the time of trial, testified that the acts of torture were necessary 
to obtain information fast and to save lives.168  
B. The Israeli Experience in the Use of Torture Against Palestinians   
For a number of years, Israel’s General Security Service (“the GSS”) 
routinely employed coercive interrogation methods towards Palestinians 
                                                 
159 See Suzanne Daley, France Is Seeking a Fine in Trial of Algerian War General, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 29, 2001, at A6 [hereinafter Daley, France Is Seeking a Fine]. 
160 See Susan Bell, France Rejects Inquiry over Algerian War Torture, THE SCOTSMAN, Nov. 
27, 2000. 
161 Id. 
162 See Robert Graham, Confession of a Torturer Open Scars of Algerian War, FIN. TIMES 
(LONDON), May 5, 2001, at 6. 
163 Daley, France Is Seeking a Fine, supra note 159, at A6. 
164 See Suzanne Daley, France Fines General, 83, for Memoir Justifying Algerian War, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, at A4. 
165 Id. 
166 Daley, France Is Seeking a Fine, supra note 159, at A6. 
167 See Harry de Quetteville, General Who Justified War Crimes Fined, THE DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Jan. 26, 2002, at 18. 
168 Daley, France Is Seeking a Fine , supra note 159, at A6. 
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suspected of involvement in or having knowledge of terrorist activity.169  
Under the GSS interrogation tactics, “untold numbers of Palestinians 
have been subjected to systematic torture, often resulting in permanent 
physical and psychological trauma and, on occasion, even death.”170  
For many years the GSS denied that it used coercive interrogation 
techniques.171  The techniques consisted of prolonged isolation of 
detainees in harsh conditions, sleep deprivation, shackling detainees in 
painful positions for long periods, usually covering their heads with sack 
cloth, making it difficult to breathe, playing loud music non-stop, 
beating and shaking detainees, and making various threats relating to 
the detainees and their families.172  These interrogation techniques 
became public knowledge in 1987 with the publication of a report by a 
national commission of inquiry on the GSS interrogation methods, 
known as the Landau Commission Report.173  The Israeli government 
established the Landau Commission, headed by a retired Israeli Supreme 
Court justice, to examine the dilemma of how a democratic society 
should respond to the prospect of using nonlethal torture in cases where 
there is the vital need to preserve the very existence of the State and its 
citizens and maintain fundamental principles of law.  
The Landau Commission Report said that the physical pressure used 
by the GSS against Palestinian detainees was “‘largely to be defended, 
both morally and legally.’”174  The Report, in effect, expressly authorized 
the GSS to use physical and psychological force on individuals suspected 
of being involved in “political subversion.”175  In fact, the Commission 
outlined what “physical methods” of interrogation were permissible, 
making it clear that the “rule of law” required that these methods be 
employed within strict guidelines, never to be exercised 
“disproportionately.”176  The Commission also concluded that the 
                                                 
169 See Mordechai Kremnitzer & Re’em Segev, The Legality of Interrogational Torture: A 
Question of Proper Authorization or a Substantive Moral Issue?, 34 ISR. L. REV. 509, 501 (2000). 
170 Ardi Imseis, “Moderate” Torture On Trial: Critical Reflections on the Israeli Supreme Court 
Judgment Concerning the Legality of General Security Service Interrogation Methods, 19 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 328, 329 (2001). 
171 See Kremnitzer & Segev, supra note 169, at 512. 
172 See id. at 511.  The Landau Commission Report is formally known as the Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry in the Matters of Investigation Methods of the General Security Service 
Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity, 23 Isr. L. Rev. 146, 146-88 (1987) [hereinafter Landau 
Commission Report] (excerpts of the Report were translated into English). 
173 See Kremnitzer & Segev, supra note 169, at 512. 
174 See Imseis, supra note 170, at 334 (quoting from the Landau Commission Report, supra 
note 169, at ¶ 2.18). 
175 See id. at 336 (emphasis omitted). 
176 Landau Commission Report, supra note 172, ¶ 3.16. 
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necessity defense was available to GSS interrogators, should any of them 
be prosecuted.177  
However, the Commission refrained from commenting on whether 
the physical interrogation methods constituted torture.  But in a 
classified appendix to the Landau Commission Report, the contents of 
which still have not been disclosed to the public, the Commission set 
forth specific guidelines concerning the conditions and limits for using 
coercive interrogation methods.178  Thereafter, the GSS continued to 
employ coercive interrogation techniques against Palestinians and 
frequently went beyond what was allowed in the Commission’s 
guidelines.179  
Despite hundreds of petitions by detainees to Israel’s Supreme 
Court, claiming that the GSS was employing illegal interrogation 
techniques, the Israeli courts routinely refused to interfere in the use of 
these harsh methods of interrogation on various procedural pretexts, 
including that the claims made were too general and did not concern a 
specific instance, or that the applicant’s interrogation had been 
completed by the time of the hearing, and hence the question was 
moot.180  This changed in 1999 when the Israeli Supreme Court held that 
while there might be a moral necessity for using exceptional 
interrogation techniques in order to save lives and, while the necessity 
defense is embodied in Israeli law, the government was not authorized 
to use such means in the absence of explicit legislation to that effect.181  In 
particular, the court emphasized, “violence directed at a suspect’s body 
or spirit does not constitute a reasonable investigation practice[,]” and 
that “a reasonable investigation is necessarily one free of torture.”182 
This decision apparently contradicted the Landau Commission’s 
finding that the GSS was authorized to use exceptional interrogation 
techniques.  The court held that the GSS interrogation techniques 
constituted torture or was cruel, unhuman, or degrading treatment, that 
the law prohibits the use of “‘brutal or inhuman means’ in the course of 
an investigation” and that Israel is a signatory to various international 
law treaties, which prohibit the use of torture, cruel, inhuman, or 
                                                 
177 See Imseis, supra note 170, at 335. 
178 See Kremnitzer & Segev, supra note 169, at 514; see also Imseis, supra note 170, at 335. 
179 See Kremnitzer & Segev, supra note 169, at 514. 
180 See id. 
181 See id. at 510; see also GSS Torture Case, supra note 137. 
182 Id. 
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degrading treatment.183  These prohibitions are “absolute,” and admit of 
no exceptions, according to the court.184  The court considered Israel’s 
statutory law of necessity, which has two “imminence” requirements.185  
First, there must be an immediate need to commit the unlawful act and, 
second, the danger to be averted must also be imminent.186  It is hard to 
understand why the statute is so written, for in practically any situation 
the need to act immediately is based on the fact that the danger to be 
averted is itself imminent.  Construing this provision, the court 
determined that the necessity defense 
might arise in instances of “ticking bombs,” and that the 
immediate need [requirement] . . . refers to the imminent 
nature of the act rather than that of the danger.  Hence, 
the imminence criteria is satisfied even if the bomb is set 
to explode in a few days, or perhaps even after a few 
weeks, provided the danger is certain to materialize and 
there is no alternative means of preventing its 
materialization.  In other words, there exists a concrete 
level of imminent danger of the explosion’s occurrence 
(references omitted).187  
Thus, the court indicated that in analyzing the necessity defense, the 
justification in using coercive interrogation techniques could apply even 
if the danger to be averted will not occur until after a few weeks.188  In 
such a situation, it is hard to understand how the interrogator would be 
justified in using coercive interrogation techniques immediately.  There 
is plenty of time, it would seem, to obtain the relevant information from 
the suspect by the use of legal alternatives. 
One can imagine some cases where the need to take action may be 
immediately necessary, even though the danger to be averted may be 
                                                 
183 See id. 
184 See id. 
185 See id. at 522. 
A person shall bear no criminal liability for committing an act 
immediately necessary for the purpose of saving the life, liberty, body 
or property, of either himself or another person, from tangible danger 
of serious harm, imminent from the particular state of affairs, at the 
requisite time, and absent alternative means for avoiding the harm. 
Id. (quoting Penal Act 1977, art. 34k (Isr)). 
186 Id. 
187 See id. at 523 (quoting HCJ 5100/94 The Public Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The 
State of Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) PD 817 § 33). 
188 Id. 
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remote in time.  Suppose a detainee has set off a timed nuclear bomb.  
The bomb will detonate in two weeks in the middle of a populated 
center and, even if people are evacuated, there will be great destruction 
to property and cultural monuments and grave environmental damage.  
But the detainee has hidden a switch which, if activated within one week 
before the bomb is scheduled to go off, will stop it.  He confesses that the 
switch is so well hidden in an underground cave that it would take days 
for workers to locate it.  Thus, in such a situation, there would be an 
imminent need to apply coercive interrogation techniques here and now, 
even though the particular danger to be avoided will not occur for two 
weeks. 
The Israeli government argued that, based on the Landau Commission 
Report, an act that meets the necessity defense is a choice of a lesser evil 
and, as such, is not only permissible, but also constitutes a moral duty.189  
As the GSS interrogators are responsible for the protection of the public, 
they are justified in employing coercive measures as part of 
interrogations when the necessity defense conditions are met.190  The 
court noted that “in the appropriate circumstances, GSS investigators 
may avail themselves of the ‘necessity’ defense, if criminally indicted[,]” 
but that the doctrine of necessity does not afford interrogators the 
general authority, ab initia, to use improper interrogation methods.191  
The decision seems to contradict the Landau Commission’s finding that 
coercive techniques were lawful and within the scope of GSS 
investigative power. 
The Israeli Supreme Court also said that it would be up to the 
legislative branch to enact laws to grant affirmative powers to the 
authorities to utilize coercive interrogation methods.192  The problem 
here, from the standpoint of the security police, is that they put 
themselves in jeopardy in that they could be prosecuted for their actions, 
and their only recourse would be to take their chances and offer the 
doctrine of necessity as a defense to possible charges. 
After the GSS torture case decision was handed down, it was 
reported that GSS interrogators designated many dozens of ticking bomb 
                                                 
189 GSS Torture Case, supra note 137. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id.  Clearly, a legal statutory provision is necessary for the purpose of authorizing the 
government to instruct in the use of physical means during the course of an interrogation, 
beyond what is permitted by the ordinary “law of investigation,” and in order to provide 
the individual GSS investigator with the authority to employ these methods.  Id. 
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detainees on whom exceptional interrogation techniques were used and 
justified under the necessity doctrine.193  In addition, the GSS continued 
to routinely use sleep deprivation, prolonged shackling in painful 
situations, and beatings (but apparently stopped using violent shaking 
and covering detainees’ heads with sacks).194  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
In The City of God, St. Augustine stated that torture is “a thing, 
indeed, to be bewailed, and, if that were possible, watered with 
fountains of tears.”195  However, it seems implausible that any right 
could be couched in absolutist terms.  Not even the right to life is 
absolute:  self-defense, for instance, is a justification for the intentional 
killing of another human being.  The blanket prohibition on torture fails 
to convince governments to refrain from the practice, and some 
governments have explicitly codified the necessity doctrine in connection 
with torture.196 
 The conclusion of this Article is that the way to handle torture in an 
extreme emergency is to recognize that, while torture is prohibited, 
necessity provides an overriding justification under the circumstances.  
One commentator has offered: 
[I]t seems strange to argue that people’s moral 
compasses will truly be damaged if torture is prohibited 
99.9% of the time rather than 100%. . . . [T]he state can 
accord great respect to human rights while still 
acknowledging that, just as it is sometimes necessary to 
deprive people of their freedom (imprison them) in 
order to protect the public, sometimes it is necessary to 
physically hurt people to protect the public.  Just 
because certain human rights norms are not absolute 
priorities of the state does not mean that the state has 
entirely lost respect for them.197 
                                                 
193 See Kremnitzer & Segev, supra note 169, at 531. 
194 See id. 
195 ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, bk. XIX, ch. 6 (1950). 
196 Great Britain has explicitly codified a necessity justification for torture—Article 134(4) 
of the Criminal Justice Act of 1988, which states that acting under “lawful authority, 
justification or excuse” is a defense against prosecution for torture.  See Criminal Justice 
Act, 1988, c. 33, § 134(4) (Eng.). 
197 Raviv, supra note 2, at 144-45. 
Cohan: Torture and the Necessity Doctrine
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
1632 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
Thus, under the necessity doctrine, torture would be permissible (or 
even justifiable) if the circumstances are so extreme that there would be a 
significant “utilitarian” advantage to the action.  In the ticking bomb 
situation, the advantage is extremely high, considering the number of 
lives to be saved compared to the (one) person tortured.  Of course, there 
is always the possibility of getting false information from the tortured 
individual.  Also, it has been pointed out that torture is not death—the 
victim survives, albeit with the memory of the painful episode.  The 
terrorist will not be killed, but will be “merely” subjected to a highly 
painful assault of his body. 
On the other hand, there is the slippery slope concern that, once 
torture is justified in certain circumstances, authorities—and world 
standards—will gradually slide down so that torture might even become 
a norm.  We actually see this is the case today in certain countries, 
including Egypt and Syria, where torture is known to be deployed on a 
fairly routine basis in numerous situations. 
It is hard to say, from a legal theory standpoint, that the necessity 
doctrine is “correct” for practically every conceivable felony as well as 
civil wrongs, but that it may not be invoked in cases of torture.  That 
would be theoretically and analytically improper.  However, as we have 
seen, the pre-emption factor may well “trump” the situation.  For if there 
is a deontological constraint that has taken on a certain weight of 
authority, as is the case in the prohibition against torture, then there is no 
exception to the rule (not even necessity). 
This discussion is of practical importance because we live in a world 
where terrorism—however you wish to define it—is a prevalent and 
persistent feature of life.  But we live in an era where a number of 
nations entertain torture not only of terrorists, but of all manner of 
prisoners under circumstances that are a far cry from meeting the criteria 
of the necessity doctrine.  Again, the necessity doctrine is largely of 
utilitarian value, so that there is hardly unanimity as to its moral 
soundness.  Yet the prospect of saving many lives that would otherwise 
be lost is morally appealing. 
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